

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

RECOGNIZING THE GREATER
READING 16TH ANNUAL DR. MAR-
TIN LUTHER KING, JR. CELEBRA-
TION

HON. JIM GERLACH

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, January 12, 2007

Mr. GERLACH. Madam Speaker, I rise today to honor the organizers of The Greater Reading Annual Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Celebration, a fantastic community event celebrating its 16th year on January 12, 2007.

This event is one part of a holiday weekend devoted to celebrating the contributions to history and the legacy of a man who was so important to our nation—Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Through non-violent protest and peaceful demonstration, Dr. King taught us lessons of equality, tolerance and understanding by drawing attention to the social injustice and racial discrimination experienced by so many of our fellow Americans for far too long.

During this year's celebration, community leaders like Mr. Albert Boscov, Ms. Barbara Marshall, Captain Bill Jimenez and Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell will receive the 2006 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Image Award. This award, given annually during the celebration, is bestowed on those community leaders who exemplify the spirit of Dr. King's life-mission and who strive to make our society a better place for all to live.

Fellowship, friendship and family will fill the air as my constituents from the greater Reading area join together to celebrate Dr. King and honor his memory.

So I ask, Madam Speaker, that my colleagues join me today in recognizing all the hard work and effort that is sure to make the Greater Reading 16th Annual Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Celebration an event most benefiting of the community and of Dr. King's legacy to us all.

TRIBUTE TO QUINTANNA WILSON
HALL ALLINIECE

HON. AL GREEN

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, January 12, 2007

Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Madam Speaker, today I would like to honor the memory of Quintanna Wilson Hall Alliniece. Mrs. Alliniece lived a life dedicated to her strong faith and to the education of multiple generations of Houston students.

Mrs. Alliniece was born in Brazoria County, Texas and moved to Houston to attend high school. She obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree in English from the Houston College for Negroes in 1942 and a Masters degree in Education from Texas Southern University.

A leader in her community, Mrs. Alliniece taught English and Mathematics for over forty

years in the Sweeny and Houston Independent School Districts. She held leadership roles in numerous organizations including the Houston League of Business and Professional Women, Inc., Zeta Phi Beta Sorority, Inc., Interfaith Ministries Food Pantry, and the YWCA. Mrs. Alliniece was also a life-long member of the Greater Zion Missionary Baptist Church where she served as Mission II President for over 35 years.

Finally, Madam Speaker, Quintanna Wilson Hall Alliniece will be missed dearly by her son and my close friend Anthony Hall Jr. He is a well-respected member of the Houston community and Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Houston. She will also be missed by her daughter-in law Carolyn, grandchildren, sisters and numerous nieces, nephews, cousins, and friends. She will be remembered in the City of Houston as a dedicated educator and valued community leader. May she rest in the peace she has richly earned.

IN OPPOSITION TO ESCALATION
OF THE WAR IN IRAQ

HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, January 12, 2007

Mr. STARK. Madam Speaker, this week, President Bush confirmed what I have known for some time: He is delusional. Twenty-thousand more troops in Iraq? No one supports this escalation: not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not the Iraq Study Group and certainly not the American people.

This administration has made mistake after mistake in an unnecessary war of its choosing. Now the President insists on sacrificing more lives, more money, and more goodwill on an increasingly lost cause.

If God really does talk to this President, I wish God would tell the President to "Bring the troops home now!" This is what the Iraqis need and it's what the American people overwhelmingly declared they wanted in November.

President Bush is incapable of managing the debacle in Iraq. Congress must therefore take matters into its own hands, blocking funding for the "surge" in particular and stopping all funding for the war in Iraq in general. Let's bring our troops home.

RECOGNIZING THE CONTRIBU-
TIONS OF KOREAN AMERICANS

HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO

OF GUAM

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, January 12, 2007

Ms. BORDALLO. Madam Speaker, I rise today to commemorate the 104th anniversary of the arrival of the first Korean immigrants to the United States, which is this Saturday, Jan-

uary 13, 2007. This date also marks the annual celebration of Korean American Day as designated by the Centennial Committees of Korean Immigration and Korean Americans.

Korean Americans have thrived in the United States since their arrival in the Hawaiian Islands in 1903. The contributions of Korean Americans to our society are found in nearly every community across our country and span the fields of arts and entertainment, economics, medicine, science and religion, among many others. Many Korean immigrants have established successful new businesses, have risen to assume important civic leadership roles within their communities, and have developed pioneering, lifesaving medical procedures.

In the early 1950s, thousands of Koreans, fleeing from war, poverty and desolation, came to the United States. The trend of Koreans immigrating to the United States continued in the years to come. In the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy lifted the United States security clearance requirement which restricted travel to and from Guam. The lifting of this security clearance requirement enabled immigration to and international investment on Guam from Korea and other countries in Asia.

Koreans began to establish residence on Guam as early as the 1970s, and in the 1980s many new Korean families arrived on island to establish a new beginning in America. Today, Korean Americans are an integral part of our island family. On this day, we celebrate the richness of their culture, their traditions, their achievements, and their contributions to our community. To that end, I also want to recognize the Korean Association of Guam. The Association serves as an important support group for new immigrants from Korea, and through its efforts, the professional and civic interests of the Korean American community on Guam are preserved and advanced.

The contributions of Korean Americans are found not only in Guam, but also in every community across the United States. Korean Americans are key contributors in the economic, medical, academic and religious fields. Notably, at least 4,000 Korean Americans serve in the United States Armed Forces. Many of these servicemembers have completed tours of duty in the Global War on Terrorism or are deployed in Iraq. Whether they are serving as leaders in their communities or fighting alongside their fellow Americans in defense of our country, Korean Americans have demonstrated their significant presence in and contributions to the United States.

I wish to express my heartfelt support for the greater Korean American community on the occasion of the 104th anniversary of the arrival of the first Korean immigrants to the United States. In doing so, I also take the opportunity to recognize the growth and contributions of the Korean Association of Guam, which was established to advance the professional and civic interests of Korean Americans in our community. Today, the Korean Association of Guam serves as an important welcoming support group for new immigrants from

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Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

Korea. Through the continued efforts and contributions of Korean Americans, the ties of United States with Korea will be strengthened in the years to come.

IRAQ INSIGHTS

HON. CHET EDWARDS

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 16, 2007

Mr. EDWARDS. Madam Speaker, distinguished colleagues, as we address the complex challenges in Iraq, I think it is important that we hear all points of view. For that reason, I am submitting for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the firsthand observations of a young Army officer who has recently served in Iraq:

IRAQ: A SOLDIER'S PERSPECTIVE

You asked me to put together some thoughts on my experience in Iraq. First, Iraq is a very complex nation with huge differences between regions and locations. The experience of one battalion can be completely different from the experience of another next to it. Every area is different. My views reflect my very narrow vantage point after less than 12 months in a tiny corner of a very large country.

Bottom line up front—I do not believe that we are winning in Iraq. This is not because we screwed up or because we lack the will, the leadership, or the resources to win. I think we have thousands of smart, brave, and talented people who are giving everything they have to make us successful. I think the American people have given us their very best sons and daughters and more than enough money and equipment to achieve our goals. Despite this, it is clear that our current strategy is not likely to produce a secure, stable, and democratic state in the Middle East. I don't know who is to blame for this and I don't really think it matters. Since we are spending the blood and treasure of the American people at an unprecedented rate, we owe it to our nation to figure out a strategy that has some hope of success or to find an alternative end state that protects our long term interest. I don't know what that strategy is, but I can offer some insights from my limited experience. This may help those smarter than me to sort out what might work from what won't work.

Political Warfare: The hardest thing for us to adjust to once we hit the ground and really tried our hand at this counter-insurgency thing was the importance of personal relationships. They can have a decisive impact on the conflict and it really doesn't matter what scale you are dealing with. Whether it is the relationship between a local shop owner and a squad leader or the relationship between the Brigade Commander and the Provincial Governor, our day to day dealings with the Iraqis and the friendships that we developed with local opinion makers from the village to the national level were the most important contribution that we made to the campaign.

The Army has a method for designing a good military campaign. You study your enemy, define the source of his strength (his 'center of gravity' in military language), figure out the most vulnerable place to attack that strength, and then design a series of missions to achieve your goal. The focus is on defeating the enemy by attacking the source of his strength. We figured out pretty quickly that this kind of strategy would not work. We could have easily expended all of our resources trying to chase down the guys on our 'most wanted' list. What we found

though is that every time we killed a terrorist (and we killed a lot of terrorists) we created ten more because now his brother, cousin, and uncle all had to seek revenge against us. It just seemed so counter-productive.

Our real goal was to persuade our Iraqi friends and allies to actively and publicly support us. We wanted them to help us tip the balance of public opinion in our favor. To influence these key individuals, we gave them funding and allowed them to take credit for civil works projects. We provided security when needed and gave them prestige by showing publicly that our commander listened to their advice. We discovered that we were not fighting a military campaign, but a political campaign—not too different from what a small town mayor might do to win re-election back in the U.S.

I don't want to give the impression that we never had to fight. There was plenty of violence and plenty of people who needed to be killed or captured. But fighting was not our goal and winning a fight did very little to achieve our long-term purpose. Our goals were political in nature. Fighting terrorists was only something we did when needed, because it interfered with our political objectives. If we could ignore the terrorists, we were winning. If we had to stop our economic and political activities in order to fight terrorists, they were winning.

This may seem like a minor difference in viewpoint, but I think it is extremely important. Every region is different, but if a unit goes into Iraq with a focus on killing bad guys, they will find more than enough bad guys to kill. After a year, their region will be as bad as or worse than it was when they arrived. On the other hand, if they focus on waging a political campaign that builds relationships with key opinion makers, and tips public opinion in their favor, they will start to see real, permanent change. Sitting down and eating goat with a prominent and respected sheik can be more valuable than a hundred midnight raids.

The U.S. Army has done a better job training its combat formations than any army in history. However, we have much to learn as an Army about how to best teach and train this style of counter-insurgency warfare. It is easier to run a rifle range than train a squad leader how to negotiate with an Arab sheik. The Army should accept that counterinsurgency will be a prominent part of our future. We will need to educate and train our future leaders to deal with the inherent unpredictability of human behavior that is so critical in this type of warfare.

The Army is planning to invest billions of dollars in a new suite of military vehicles that will 'eliminate uncertainty' by inter-netting every weapon on the battlefield to provide near-perfect situational awareness. I'm sure this will have its advantages in the future, but I think this investment is misguided. In a year in Iraq that had no shortage of enemy contact, I never needed to see down the barrel of a tank or Bradley. We had smart, well-trained soldiers who knew when and who to shoot. If leaders started getting involved in that decision, we almost always screwed it up. The guy on the ground knows the situation better than anyone. The more that technology enables his leader to see what he sees, the less his judgment and instinct will be used.

Iraq has taught us that uncertainty will always be a major factor in warfare. War is a distinctly human phenomenon and man is notoriously unpredictable. Trying to lift the fog of war with information technology is a hopeless task and a waste of resources. We should invest those dollars revamping our officer and NCO education systems to teach young leaders how to handle Iraqi farmers,

Afghan mullahs, and Sudanese warlords. A squad leader with a thorough understanding of Shia Islam and the history of Iraq is a lot more valuable than a squad leader with a camera on the end of his rifle. War always has been and always will be about people. If we want to revolutionize our Army we should invest in educating and training our people.

Enemy Motivation: During the course of the year, I had the chance to talk to a few leaders from the Mahdi militia and a few jihadists from the Sunni side. What amazed me about these guys is the total lack of any collective, long-term vision about why they are fighting us. There is no practical end state that they are trying to achieve. The radicals from both camps are absolutely convinced that they are under obligation from Allah to kill non-Muslims who occupy Arab lands regardless of the long-term consequences for their country. There is no amount of practical reasoning that will change this viewpoint. We have invested millions of dollars in public works projects in some towns to improve the lives of the people only to see citizens from those same towns attack and, in some cases, kill our soldiers. This is not rational behavior.

I believe that the majority of the insurgents fight us because they want the prestige and respect that other Muslims in their history and in neighboring countries have obtained by fighting foreign occupation. This reality should impact our national policy and our expectations. We have to accept the inconvenient fact that there will always be a significant level of insurgency in Iraq so long as non-Muslim troops occupy the country. No amount of political settlement or economic development will change that. This is something that our Congress and our Administration have to come to terms with. Unfortunately, I don't have any brilliant ideas on how to deal with this, but I am convinced that the insurgency in Iraq will not end one day before the last American soldier leaves the country. This is a reality that we must accept and must plan for.

Iraqi Security Forces: The Iraqi security forces (Army and Police) that I worked with ranged from superb to completely incompetent. Like any organization, the character of the unit was largely determined by the character of the commanding officer. Many were excellent (the best officers, in my experience, came from Saddam's old Army). Most officers did a great job when facing Sunni-based insurgents. In fact, we had to keep a close eye on most units to make sure they were not too heavy-handed against the Sunnis. When we dealt with the Shia, especially the Mahdi militia, things got a lot more complicated. Many officers were reluctant to fight the Shia militias because they had a well-justified fear for the security of their family. I have seen senior Iraqi officers flat refuse to follow American soldiers in pursuit of Shia insurgents—even when those insurgents just killed their own soldiers.

An Iraqi officer in either the police or the Army has to walk a very fine line. If he does not cooperate with the Americans, he risks losing the money, equipment, and prestige that come from American support. If he cooperates completely, especially in the pursuit of Shia targets, he is labeled a traitor, and his family and career can be in great danger. I have seen members of the National Assembly and Provincial Governors place tremendous pressure on police and Army commanders to get them to look the other way when it came to Shia militia activity. The few ISF commanders who are truly 'independent' are constantly under threat of being fired or worse. Most commanders manage to survive by establishing a delicate truce with the Shia radicals. They openly